Reynolds v. USX Corp by unknown
2003 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-15-2003 
Reynolds v. USX Corp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003 
Recommended Citation 
"Reynolds v. USX Corp" (2003). 2003 Decisions. 880. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/880 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2003 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
     NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 01-3941
DEBORAH REYNOLDS
v.
USX CORPORATION,
       Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Civil Action No. 00-cv-05507
(Honorable Marvin Katz)
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 19, 2002
Before:  SCIRICA, ALITO and McKEE, Circuit Judges
(Filed January 15, 2003)
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
USX Corporation appeals from an order denying its motion for judgment as a matter
of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a).  We will affirm.
     1Employer liability under the PHRA follows the standard applied under Title VII. 
Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 317 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted).  Therefore, we must only review the record under the Title VII standard.  
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I.
Plaintiff Deborah Reynolds, an African-American female, was hired in 1988 by
defendant USX.  From 1990 until her final day on the job, July 17, 1998, Reynolds worked
in the cold reduction department of the defendant’s steel mill.  She was a member of the
United Steel Worker’s Union of America and was paid at an hourly rate.  In October 1995,
Reynolds filed her first allegation of racial and gender discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission.  Reynolds subsequently filed two more complaints with the EEOC and PHRC
in 1997 and 1998.  The complaints charged USX with discriminatory treatment on the basis
of Reynolds’ race and gender, in addition to retaliation for her previous filings with the
EEOC and PHRC.  All of the allegations in Reynolds’ agency complaints were eventually
dismissed.
Reynolds’ civil complaint alleged violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (amended 1991) (“Title VII”), and the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 951-963 (amended 1991)
(“PHRA”).1  At trial, the jury found in favor of USX on Reynolds’ claims of retaliation and
racial and gender discrimination.  But the jury awarded Reynolds $70,000 in compensatory
3damages on her hostile work environment claim.  After denying USX’s Rule 50(a) motion,
the District Court ordered USX to pay Reynolds $54,853.50 for attorney’s fees.
On appeal, USX contends the adverse jury verdict should be overturned because: (1)
the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish a hostile work environment
claim; (2) the alleged offensive epithets were made by fellow union employees, therefore
Reynolds did not establish respondeat superior liability; and (3) Reynolds failed to notify a
member of USX’s management of the epithets as required by its sexual harassment policy. 
With respect to the award of attorney’s fees, USX contends that the lodestar amount should
be reduced to reflect the failure of Reynolds’ claims for retaliation and discrimination.
II.
We review whether the District Court erred as a matter of law under a plenary
standard, while viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Reynolds.  Kunin v.
Sears Roebuck and Co., 175 F.3d 289, 293 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Shade v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 154 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 1998)).  The central question is
whether there was “insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability.” 
Kunin, 175 F.3d at 293 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A claim for hostile work environment consists of five elements: (1) intentional
discrimination on the basis of race or gender; (2) pervasive and regular discrimination; (3)
detrimental effect to the plaintiff; (4) detrimental effect to a reasonable person of the same
race or gender in the same position; and (5) respondeat superior liability.  Id. at 293 (citing
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990)).
4USX contends that Reynolds did not satisfy the fourth element of the Andrews test
because the conduct to which she was exposed was not objectively hostile.  The salient
indicia of proof by which the fourth element is measured “include the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
performance.”  Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).  Viewing the disputed
facts in the light most favorable to Reynolds, we cannot conclude that the jury acted
unreasonably.  Reynolds began recording what had been said and done to her in a personal
journal in January 1995.  By July 1998, Reynolds recorded having been called a “bitch” at
least six times by various union “team leaders” under whom she worked in the steel mill. 
Reynolds’ co-worker testified that on one occasion Reynolds’ team leader referred to her
as a “dumb black bitch.”  Another co-worker corroborated Reynolds’ allegation of
continuous verbal hostility testifying that she heard team leaders call Reynolds “the N
word, the C word [and] the B word.”  Reynolds offered evidence that she was taunted with
nude pictures from a men’s magazine.  Finally, Reynolds testified that she was repeatedly
disciplined and denied training opportunities by team leaders and members of USX’s
management on account of racial or gender animus.  In view of this evidence, the jury
verdict was not unreasonable.  See Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074,
1082 (3d Cir. 1996) (observing that “a plaintiff’s ability to prove discrimination indirectly,
circumstantially, must not be crippled ... because of crabbed notions of relevance or
excessive mistrust of juries”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
5USX also contends that Reynolds did not established respondeat superior liability
because the team leaders were co-workers, not supervisors.  See Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802 (1998) (holding that an employer can be held vicariously liable
for harassing conduct of a supervisor “made possible by the abuse of his supervisory
authority”).   USX correctly observes that team leaders are, like Reynolds, union
employees who earn an hourly wage and lack the authority to formally discipline another
union employee.  Reynolds, however, testified that members of management as well as
team leaders were sometimes present when co-workers told her, among other things, that
“women don’t belong in the mill.”  Reynolds also presented evidence that members of
management took tangible adverse employment actions against her by changing her work
assignments, denying her training opportunities, issuing her disciplinary suspensions and
ultimately issuing her a disciplinary discharge.  See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 760 (1998) (recognizing that every Federal Court of Appeals has imposed
vicarious liability where “a discriminatory act results in a tangible employment action”);
Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 267 n.10 (3d Cir. 2001) (defining a “tangible
employment action” as “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing significant change in benefits”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Thus, we cannot say that no reasonable juror could have determined that management knew
or should have known about the environment of gender based hostility on the steel mill
floor.  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759 (providing that an employer is negligent if it knew or should
6have known of sexual harassment and failed to stop it).  We hold Reynolds presented
sufficient evidence for a jury to find respondeat superior liability.  The supervisory status
of the team leaders is an issue which we need not decide.
USX’s final argument rests upon Reynolds’ failure to avail herself of its sexual
harassment policy.  But this affirmative defense is no longer at USX’s disposal because it
fired Reynolds.  See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (holding that no affirmative defense is
available “when the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment action,
such as discharge”).  Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court denying
USX’s Rule 50(a) motion.
III.
USX also challenges the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to Reynolds under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (granting discretion to district courts to award reasonable attorney’s
fees to prevailing party under this subchapter).  We review the reasonableness of the award
for abuse of discretion.  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1182 (3d Cir. 1990)
(citation omitted). 
USX contends the lodestar amount of Reynolds’ attorney’s fees award should be
reduced to reflect the failure of her claims of discrimination and retaliation.  In Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the plaintiff was deemed to have “prevailed” for purposes
of an attorney’s fees award under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), yet he did not prevail in each of
his individual claims for relief.  According to the Supreme Court, there are two inquiries
relevant to adjusting the lodestar amount: “First, did the plaintiff fail to prevail on claims
7that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded?  Second, did the plaintiff achieve
a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making
a fee award?”  Id. at 434.  In situations where “the plaintiff’s claims for relief involve a
common core of facts or will be based on related legal theories,” the district court should
compare the overall relief to the hours reasonably expended by the attorney on the
litigation.  Id. at 435.  In this case, the District Court expressly found that the
circumstances and evidence relating to Reynolds’ claims of intentional discrimination were
relevant to her successful hostile work environment claim.  Therefore, the order awarding
Reynolds attorney’s fees in the amount of $54,853.50 will be affirmed.
IV.
Because the evidence on the record is sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to find
in favor of Reynolds’ hostile work environment claim, we will affirm the denial of USX’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a).  In
addition, we will affirm the District Court’s award of reasonable attorney’s fees.
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/   Anthony J. Scirica
Circuit Judge
